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AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF MEDIAJUDICIARY RELATIONS: WHAT THE NONLEGAL EVIDENCE SUGGESTS ABOUT THE
FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS ISSUE
Robert E. Drechsel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The fair trial-free press debate has long been a curious mixture
of conflict and consensus. A consensus approach has been apparent
in efforts by the bar, bench and media to fashion rules and guidelines governing the release and dissemination of potentially prejudicial information.' However, the genesis of the issue appears to lie in
conflict, in situations where the media have been accused of conduct
so extreme as to have ruined a defendant's right to an impartial jury,
or where the media have been expected to behave in a manner so
extreme as to ruin a defendant's right to an impartial jury.'
*

Associate Professor, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of

Wisconsin-Madison; B.A. 1971, M.A. 1976, Ph.D. 1980, University of Minnesota. The author
wishes to acknowledge the Graduate School Research Committee at the University of Wisconsin-Madison for the financial support that made a major portion of this research possible.
1. For a useful overview of such consensus efforts, see J. GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME:
COURTS AND PRESS IN CONFLICT (1983). Gerald's title itself suggests that conflict has characterized much of media-judiciary relations.
2. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 6-13 (1986) (finding a
qualified first amendment right of access to preliminary hearings in a criminal proceeding);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (holding that "the right
to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment . . .absent
overriding interests); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (holding that the sixth
amendment does not give the press an affirmative right of access to pretrial suppression hear-
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The fair trial-free press issue may well have provoked more discussion among the bench, bar, and media than any other issue. However, generalizing about the nature of day-to-day judiciary-media relations on the basis of egregious situations-which, of course,

constitute the basis for most of the litigation involving fair trial-free
press questions-could lead to major misperceptions. If the resulting

perception is that relationships are generally tense, suspicious and
adversarial, and if that perception is incorrect, it could needlessly

discourage journalists and judicial sources from interacting.
Consequently, this Article approaches the issue of media-judici-

ary relations from a different perspective, that of social scientific research. It begins with a very brief overview of the historical and legal development of the fair trial-free press issue.' This Article then

analyzes social scientific research bearing on such questions as how
common fair trial-free press disputes actually are,' whether the fair

trial-free press issue appears to be a major concern for most judicial
ings); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (finding an order restraining the
press from reporting or commenting on publicly-held judicial proceedings in a widely reported
murder case to be a prior restraint in violation of the first amendment); Murphy v. Florida,
421 U.S. 794 (1975) (finding no due process violation where petitioner contended he did not
receive a fair trial because jurors had learned of prior felony convictions or facts about the
crime with which he was charged from extensive press coverage); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966) (finding that "massive, pervasive and prejudicial" publicity that was inadequately controlled by the trial court denied petitioner a fair trial in violation of the Due Process Clause); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (holding that television coverage of a criminal trial constitutes a due process violation); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)
(finding a due process violation where petitioner's request for change of venue was denied after
a local television station repeatedly televised petitioner's confession to sheriff on the day after
his arrest for robbery, kidnapping and murder); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (finding a
due process violation where change of venue was granted after inflammatory publicity but only
to an adjoining county which was also highly prejudiced).
The secondary literature on the topic is voluminous. See generally, S. BARBER, NEWS
CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM: A FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL DEBATE (1987); R. DRECHSEL,

NEWS MAKING IN THE TRIAL COURTS (1983) [hereinafter NEWS MAKING]; H. FELSHER &
M. ROSEN, THE PRESS IN THE JURY Box (1966); A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND
PUBLICITY (1967); J. GERALD, supra note 1; D. GILLMOR, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL
(1966); J. LOFTON, JUSTICE AND THE PRESS (1966); H. SULLIVAN, TRIAL BY NEWSPAPER

(1961); J. Stanga, The Press and the Criminal Defendant: Newsmen and Criminal Justice in
Three Wisconsin Cities (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, available at University of Wisconsin-Madison). Virtually all of the textbooks focusing on mass media law give major attention to the fair trial-free press issue. See, e.g., T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE 355-425 (4th ed. 1988); D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 485-557 (4th ed. 1984); K. MIDDLETON & B. CHAMBERLIN,
THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 385-434 (1988); D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 350-89

(5th ed. 1990).
3. See infra notes 13-68 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 69-106 and accompanying text.
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sources, 5 what judicial sources actually mean when they complain
about prejudicial publicity6 and the existence of evidence that guidelines and standards are effective in resolving problems.7
The focus of this Article then shifts to the larger question of
media-judiciary relations in general.8 Data from a series of studies
conducted by the author on the interaction between sources and
journalists in trial courts is examined and analyzed.9 The resulting
data bear directly on questions of how routine relationships between
journalists and judicial sources might best be characterized, 10 what
factors appear most central to these relationships," and what role
fair trial-free press considerations play. 1"
II. THE LEGAL CONTEXT: A BRIEF SKETCH

Complaints about prejudicial publicity in America can be
traced back at least as far as 1807 when Aaron Burr unsuccessfully
complained that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find an
unprejudiced jury because the treason charges against him had been
so widely publicized. 13 There are other examples of such complaints
during the 19th century, although the incidents seem surprisingly
isolated. For example, during the trial in 1855 of several persons involved in a riot, a defense attorney sought to have the Chicago Tribune cited for contempt and prohibited from further reporting on the
case after the Tribune published allegedly false and disrespectful
statements about the defendants. 4 Although the court declined to
act against the newspaper, the judge remarked that "it was very
wrong for newspapers to publish articles which may influence the
result of the trial one way or another; and that it was very desirable
that if any reports at all were published, that they should be simple
5. See infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 121-49 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 150-225 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 165-225 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 191-225 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 206-26 and accompanying text. The focus here will not be on evidence about whether media in fact can make a fair trial impossible. That is a separate issue,
although it may be that such beliefs affect media-judiciary relationships. See generally J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 3-22; D. PEMBER, supra note 2, at 364-69.
13. For a useful discussion of the case, see J. GERALD, supra note 1, at 70-72 (citing 1
REPORTS OF THE TRIAL OF COLONEL AARON BURR FOR TREASON AND FOR A MISDEMEANOR

(D. Robertson, rep. 1808)).
14. Trial of the Rioters, Chi. Tribune, June 19, 1855, at 3, col. 2.
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relations of facts as they occurred." 15 Several times during the nine-

teenth century, there were reports that sensational coverage of crimi16
nal cases caused courthouse violence.
As early as 1859, an apparently angry former journalist, Lambert Wilmer, published a scathing attack on the press. Wilmer
charged that
the newspapers of the United States ... make it impossible for any
man charged with a criminal offense to have a fair trial; ... they
have often caused the most desperate offenders to be acquitted and
turned loose on society; and ... many innocent persons, by their
unwise or malicious meddling, have been brought to condemnation
17
and punishment.

Wilmer also charged that criminal defendants frequently bribed the
press to obtain favorable publicity, but he offered no proof that this
occurred. 18 By the middle to late nineteenth century, complaints that
the press was interfering with the right to a fair trial were also appearing with increased frequency in the law journals.' 9
Until the 1960s, the most salient issue involving media coverage
of the judiciary appears to have been the degree to which judges
could use the contempt power to control media commentary about
15. Id.; see also United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 363 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No.
15,383) (court agreed to provide space in courtroom for press only after reporters agreed to
publish nothing until after trial); Chi. Tribune, Aug. 8, 1875, at 16, col. 2 (reporting that
prosecutor believed newspapers should be held in contempt for speculating about verdict, but
apparently didn't pursue contempt citation); N.Y. Herald, Oct. 16, 1846, at 1, col. I (noting
that defense counsel in murder case "intended" to seek order suppressing ex parte statements
but didn't follow through). For research on newspaper coverage of particular cases, see Bas-

kette, Reporting the Webster Case, America's ClassicMurder, 24 JOURNALISM Q. 250 (1947);
Eberhard, Mr. Bennett Covers a Murder Trial, 47 JOURNALISM Q. 457 (1970); Nordin, The
EntertainingPress:Sensationalism in Eighteenth Century Boston Newspapers, 6 COMM. RES.
295 (1979). For an overview of the historical development of newspaper reporting of trial court
proceedings and an analysis of data on newspaper reporting of trial court proceedings in Minnesota and a northeastern state, see NEws MAKING, supra note 2, at 35-77 and sources cited
Infra notes 164-224 and accompanying text.
16. A classic example is James Gordon Bennett's New York Herald coverage of a murder trial in which a mob formed at the courthouse and the defendant had to be carried out of
court by the authorities. See E. EMERY & M. EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 123 (4th ed.
1978). For other examples of concerns about disorder resulting from highly publicized criminal
cases, see N.Y. Evening Post, Feb. 12, 1872, at 3, col. 5; N.Y. Herald, Jan. 19, 1866, at 2, col.
4; Boston Transcript, Mar. 31, 1850, at 1, col. 5.
17. L. WILMER, OUR PRESS GANG, OR, A COMPLETE EXPOSITION OF THE CORRUPTIONS
AND CRIMES OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 52 (1859 & reprint ed. 1970).
18. Id. at 228.
19. See, e.g., Trial by Newspaper, 11 ALB. L.J. 248 (1875); W. Forrest, Trial by Newspapers, 14 CRIM. L. MAG. 553 (1892).
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judicial action. That issue, however, seems to have dissipated after a
series of Supreme Court rulings held that absent a clear and present
danger that justice would be impaired, any use of the contempt
power to punish out-of-court comment on pending or decided cases
violates the first amendment.2 0
Attention then turned more directly to the impact of media cov-

erage on defendants' fair trial rights.2 ' In essence, the Supreme
Court held that although media coverage can deny due process to a
criminal defendant,22 judges have a variety of tools short of prior
restraint to avoid such problems. 23 The Court made it almost impossible for lower courts to restrain journalists from communicating
what they observe in open court or otherwise obtain by lawful
means. 24 The Court has concluded that the press and public have a
qualified first amendment right to attend criminal trials, 25 prelimi27
nary hearings2 6 and jury selection.
20. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (reversing a contempt citation for sheriff's criticism of judge's handling of grand jury in absence of sufficient evidence of clear and
present danger); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (reversing a contempt citation for
newspaper criticism of judge's handling of case in absence of clear and present danger); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (reversing a contempt citation for newspaper criticism
of local judges in absence of evidence of clear and present danger); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941) (reversing a contempt citation for newspaper comment about judge and judicial process in pending case in absence of a showing of clear and present danger).
21. See infra notes 22-34 (setting forth the Supreme Court cases).
22. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
23. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358-62 (recommending that to avoid the "carnival atmosphere" of the trial, the court could have, inter alia, limited the number of reporters in the
courtroom, regulated their conduct more closely, insulated the witnesses and controlled the
release of information to the press by the participants).
24. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (holding a statute
violative of the first amendment which made it a crime to publish the name of a youth charged
with a crime without written approval of the juvenile court where newspapers lawfully learned
the names); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (reversing a
pretrial order enjoining the media from publishing information about a juvenile obtained at
court proceedings open to the public); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(finding prior restraint unconstitutional where court order restrained the press from reporting
or commenting on publicly held judicial proceedings); see also Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (striking down a statute as violative of the first amendment which made it a crime for persons unrelated to a judicial inquiry to divulge or publish
truthful information about the confidential proceeding).
25. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
26. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). Seven years earlier,
the Court held that the press and public did not have a sixth amendment right to attend
preliminary hearings. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press reported that within six months of the Gannett decision, there
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In 1965, the Supreme Court held that televised coverage of pretrial and trial proceedings in a criminal case inherently violated the
defendant's right to due process of law guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment. 8 Sixteen years later, however, the Court seemingly reversed its position and held that camera coverage of criminal
trials, even over the objection of defendants, does not inherently violate due process absent a showing of actual prejudice.2" The Court
thus sanctioned decisions in a growing number of states which allow
camera coverage of court proceedings.3 0
In essence, the Supreme Court has made it nearly impossible to
use direct restrictions31 on the news media to control possible fair
were 109 attempts to close criminal court proceedings. Secret Court Watch, NEws MEDIA &
THE LAW, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 17.
27. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).

28. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
29. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). The Court concluded that Estes did not
announce a per se constitutional bar to photographic, radio, and television coverage. Id. at
570-74.
30. As of 1987, 45 states permitted cameras and recording equipment in trial courts to
varying degrees. See T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 422. The publicity of the Lindbergh kidnapping trial in 1935 is often credited with galvanizing opposition to
camera coverage of the courts. K. MIDDLETON & B. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 2, at 405. But
see S. BARBER, supra note 2, at 3-8 (describing the trial and stating that "the presence of
cameras and news photographers inside the courtroom were not, in and of themselves, responsible for the [trial's] undecorous tone .... "). The result of the opposition movement was the
drafting of ABA's Canon 35, which advised prohibition of such coverage. See Chandler, 449
U.S. at 562-64; S. BARBER, supra note 2, at 8-9. Canon 35 of the ABA's Code of Judicial
Ethics became Canon 3A(7) in a revision of the code in 1972. Chandler, 449 U.S. at 563.
Canon 3A(7), as amended August 11, 1982, states the following:
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing in
courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court, or recesses between sessions, except that under rules prescribed by a supervising appellate court or other appropriate authority, a judge may authorize broadcasting, televising, recording and photographing of judicial proceedings in courtrooms and areas
immediately adjacent thereto consistent with the right of the parties to a fair trial
and subject to express conditions, limitations, and guidelines which allow such coverage in a manner that will be unobtrusive, will not distract the trial participants,
and will not otherwise interfere with the administration of justice.
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (1982). For a useful historical perspective
concerning the adoption of the original Canon 35, see Kielbowicz, The Story Behind the
Adoption of the Ban on Courtroom Cameras, 63 JUDICATURE 14 (1979). Federal courts remain off-limits to cameras. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
31. Direct restrictions include contempt proceedings and other express prohibitions of
publication amounting to a prior restraint. See STANDING COMM. ON ASS'N COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS: THE AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS 19, 22 (1981) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. Indirect methods
include continuance of the trial until the publicity dissipates, severance of trials so that publicity regarding one defendant does not affect a co-defendant, change of venue, change of venire;
intensive voir dire, the granting of additional peremptory challenges, sequestration of the jury,
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trial problems. Even in Sheppard v. Maxwela 2-- which presented an
extreme example of outrageous behavior by the media in coverage of
a criminal case-the Supreme Court's opinion was striking for its
failure to suggest restraints on the media as a remedy. 33 Rather, the
Court suggested better control of parties to the proceedings, and the
use of continuance, sequestration, change of venue or even mistrial
to protect the defendant's rights.3 4
Although even a cursory examination of the case law might suggest endemic conflict and hostility between trial courts and the news
media, such a generalization might be exaggerated. As early as
1924, the American Bar Association (ABA) authorized appointment
of a committee to work with representatives of the American Society
of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) to investigate cooperative efforts to
address the fair trial-free press issue.3 5 The ASNE rejected the overture, stating it "would not cooperate in any venture which might
lead to regulation of the press." ' However, in 1937, representatives
of the bar and the news media met and recommended formation of
national and local committees to encourage voluntary self-restraint
by the news media.37 As Professor Donald Gillmor noted, however,
discussions of bilateral codes of conduct "got off to a bad start" because "[t]oo much of the exchange between bar and press has depended upon invective and cliche."3 "
Perhaps in response to the "misbehavior" revealed in such cases
as Irvin v. Dowds9 and Rideau v. Louisiana,40 and the manner in
and stressing the importance of disregarding the media when instructing the jury. Id. at 19.

32. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). The Court found that the excessive pre-trial publicity surrounding defendant's prosecution for bludgeoning his pregnant wife to death prevented him

from receiving a fair trial. Id. at 362-63.
33. The Court reversed Sheppard's murder conviction. Id. at 363. Justice Clark's opinion devoted 11 pages to describing the conduct that made reversal necessary. For example,

front page editorials demanding Sheppard's arrest, allegations in news coverage that he was a
perjurer and a liar, publication of a wide range of evidence and allegations never used at trial

and failure by the judge to prevent exposure of the jury to such coverage. Id. at 338-49.
34. Id. at 357-63.

35. J. Stanga, supra note 2, at 8-9.
36. Id. at 8.
37. D. GILLMOR, supra note 2, at 177.
38. Id. at 179.
39. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Dowd, the media publicized a murder defendant's prior
record, accused him of being a parole violator, revealed that he was picked out of a police lineup, characterized him as remorseless, described him as a "confessed slayer" and conducted
curbside opinion polls as to how he should be punished. Id. at 725-26. The record showed that
90 percent of the prospective jurors suspected or believed that he was guilty. Id. at 727. The
Supreme Court reversed his conviction on grounds that there was evidence of "a pattern of
deep and bitter prejudice" against the defendant. Id.
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which the police and news media handled the publicity of the assas-

sination of President John F. Kennedy, 4 1 a flurry of efforts to develop
standards to protect defendants from prejudicial publicity occurred
in the 1960S.42 In 1964, the ABA appointed what has come to be

known as the Reardon Committee to develop standards to deal with
concerns about media interference with fair trials.4 a The "Reardon
Report" was published late in 1966. 44 Its most controversial recommendation was a suggestion that the power of judicial contempt be
used against the media, if necessary, to safeguard fair trial rights.45
The report also recommended restricting public access to portions of
40. 373 U.S. 723 (1963). In Rideau, after a defendant was arrested for murder, bank
robbery and kidnapping, the sheriff invited a local television station to film the sheriff's "interview" with the defendant during which the defendant confessed. Id. at 724. The film was then
broadcast three times. A change of venue was denied and the defendant was convicted and
sentenced to death. Id. at 724-25. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, calling the trial
a "hollow formality." Id. at 726.
41. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN F. KENNEDY 240-42 (1964) [hereinafter the WARREN COMMISSION REPORT]. Professor
Gillmor provides a good summary of the fair trial issues that arose in the wake of media
coverage of the assassination. D. GILLMOR, supra note 2, at 16-22.
42. See, e.g. ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR

TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1968) [hereinafter REARDON REPORT]; SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO,
TELEVISION AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE OF THE AsS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y.,
FREEDOM OF PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967) [hereinafter MEDINA REPORT]. Such standards
include, inter alia,the non-dissemination of information by attorneys in pending criminal trials
where there is a likelihood of interference with the due administration of justice, REARDON
REPORT, supra, at § 1.1; the prohibition of disclosure of information relating to pending criminal trials to unauthorized persons by judicial employees, id. at § 2.3; and, under appropriate
circumstances, the sequestration of the jury at any point during the trial, including the initial
phases, Id. at § 3.5(b).
43. See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO

FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS V-X (Tent. Draft 1966) [hereinafter REARDON REPORT (TENT.
DRAFT)].
44. Id. at v. Essentially, the committee recommended that six types of information not
be made public because they may be prejudicial: a defendant's prior criminal record; admissions, confessions or statements given by the accused; results of, or refusal to submit to, examinations or tests; the identity, expected testimony or credibility of witnesses; the possibility of a
guilty plea; opinions as to a defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at § I.I.
45. See id. at § 4.1. Such "necessary" circumstances include, but are not limited to,
violations of a valid judicial order not to disseminate, and extra-judicial statements reasonably
calculated to affect the outcome of the trial. See id.; see also id. at 151-54 (containing the
committee's commentary about this recommendation). The language on use of the contempt
power was toned down, but not eliminated, in the approved rules. For example, the "reasonably calculated" language was changed to prohibit only extra-judicial statements "willfully
designed by that person" to affect the outcome of the trial. See REARDON REPORT, supra note
42 at 27-28; REARDON REPORT (TENT. DRAFT), supra note 43, at § 4.1.
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pre-trial hearings and trials.4" Meanwhile, the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York had appointed its own committee to address
the fair trial-free press issue." Its report, the "Medina Report," spe-

cifically rejected use of the contempt power against journalists,4 8
suggested greater restraint by participants in the criminal process, 49
and urged the media to develop voluntary codes of conduct to govern
crime reporting.50 The Judicial Conference also entered the debate
and adopted guidelines for the federal courts that suggested limits on
comment by attorneys and courthouse personnel (although not by
law enforcement officials), but specifically rejected any direct controls on the news media.5
Almost simultaneously, a committee of the American Newspaper Publishers Association issued a report rejecting virtually any restrictions on judicial reporting:
This Committee, therefore, cannot recommend any covenants
of control or restrictions on the accurate reporting of criminal matters, or anything that would impair such reporting.
The Committee does recommend that the press stand at any
time ready to discuss these problems with any appropriate individuals or groups .... But there can be no agreement on the part of
the American Press to dilute its responsibility, or to circumvent the
basic rights and provisions of the Constitution. 2

Both the ABA 5" and the Judicial Conference 54 have updated
their guidelines in light of court decisions expanding the first amend46. REARDON REPORT (TENT. DRAFT), supra note 43, at §§3.1, 3.5(d). Specifically, a
defendant may request that public access be restricted on the ground that evidence which
would be inadmissible at trial would be disseminated, thus interfering with the defendant's
right to a fair trial. Id. Such a request will be granted unless it is determined that there is no
substantial likelihood of such interference. Id.
47. See MEDINA REPORT, supra note 42, at vii-xi.
48. Id. at 11.
49. Id. at 25-26, 32-35.
50. Id. at 67.
51. See Report of the Comm. on the Operationof the Jury System on the "Free PressFair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 400-03 (1968). In addition, the U.S. Justice Department
issued guidelines for the release of information by its personnel. Release of Information by
Personnel of the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal and Civil Proceedings, 28 C.F.R.
§50.2 (1988).
52. AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS AW5'N, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 10 (1967).
53. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 31. The revised rules also restrict use of the contempt power considerably more than the earlier rules. REARDON REPORT, supra note 42, at
§ 4.1; see also id. at 22.
54. Revised Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operationof the Jury
System on the "Free Press-FairTrial" Issue, 87 F.R.D. 519 (1980).
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ment rights of attorneys, 55 creating barriers to orders directing the
press not to publish material it obtained in open court proceedings,56
and granting the press and public a first amendment right of access
57
to judicial proceedings.
Meanwhile, lawyers, judges and editors in many states have begun to discuss the fair trial-free press issue.58 By 1987, voluntary
bench-bar-press guidelines had been developed in at least 28 states. 9
Yet, such guidelines themselves have become the subject of conflict.
The most striking example to date is Federated Publications v.
Swedberg0 in which the Washington Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court which refused to admit reporters to a pretrial hearing unless they agreed in writing to abide by the state's
voluntary bench-bar-press guidelines. 6 ' Washington had been among
the earliest and most active states to develop press-bar cooperation, 2
but in response to the Swedberg decision, "the state's media associations withdrew their support from the guidelines" 63 and Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 4 which largely freed the media from
prior restraints in the context of reporting on the courts, stemmed.
from a state trial judge's order that made voluntary guidelines le55. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding vague and overbroad
portions of disciplinary rule limiting lawyers' comments on pending litigation); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)
(holding local court rules regulating lawyers' extrajudicial comments on litigation were overbroad); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding judge's order restricting
comment by counsel, litigants and others was unconstitutional); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d
1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that judge's order prohibiting extrajudicial comment by counsel
and criminal defendants was unconstitutional).
56. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
57. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
58. See Collen & Betzold, Between the Media and the Bar . . ., BENCH & BAR OF
MINN., Feb. 1985, at 11 (describing the methods that the Minnesota bar and media use to
resolve conflicts between each other); Finch, First Amendment/Sixth Amendment
Rights-Problems and Progressin Press-BarConflicts, 36 J. Mo. BAR 362 (1980) (discussing
Gannett, Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) and the National News Council's attempts
to have the media and the courts cooperate voluntarily); Niehaus, Musings of a Trial Judge,
14 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 203, 204-07 (1987) (discussing the controversy regarding the use cameras in Ohio courts); Cooke, Press Freedom, Open Courtrooms Go Together, N.Y.L.J., Feb.
23, 1988, at 2, col. 3 (advocating the freedom of the press to cover a trial, except where the
defendant's right to trial is unalterably threatened).
59.

D. PEMBER, supra note 2, at 383.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

96 Wash. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).
Id. at 23, 633 P.2d at 78.
K. MIDDLETON & B. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 2, at 432.
Id. at 433.
427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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gaily binding.65
To summarize, Supreme Court decisions during the past two decades have limited the options available to courts for controlling
prejudicial publicity. In general, the first amendment has been held
to require open criminal proceedings 66 and to prohibit the use of restraining orders to prevent the media from publishing information
they obtain by legal means.67 Although bench, bar and press have
tried to agree on a voluntary solution to whatever problem there
might be with prejudicial publicity, the receptiveness of the parties
has varied over time. 68 Because of the Supreme Court's decisions in
favor of the news media, self-restraint and compromise appear more
than ever to be the only available appropriate action. That, in turn,
makes it more important than ever to have a clearer picture of how
serious and widespread a fair trial-free press problem there is, and
how much of a reservoir of trust and goodwill might be available to
draw upon when problems arise. We can turn, then, to the social
scientific evidence bearing on this question.
III.

PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY:

How WIDESPREAD A PROBLEM?

A. How Common Is PrejudicialPublicity?
"There is scarcely one inmate of our fifty state penitentiaries
who has had the fair and impartial trial, doubly guaranteed by our
federal and state constitutions, and this because of Trial by Newspaper." 69 Such was attorney Harold Sullivan's indictment of the press
65. Before Nebraska Press was decided by a full Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun, in
a chambers opinion, concluded that state courts could legally impose voluntary guidelines on
the media so long as they were pertinent to the case at hand and were adequately specific. 423
U.S. 1327, 1331 (1975). Blackmun concluded, however, that the guidelines in question were
too vague to be constitutional. Id. at 1330-31. The full Court never had to directly confront the
guidelines question because the Nebraska Supreme Court held the trial court's legal enforcement of the guidelines to be unconstitutional: "The guidelines were not intended to be contractual and cannot be enforced as if they were." State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 801, 236
N.W.2d 794, 805 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976); see also State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377 (1977), superseded on other
grounds, State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 71 n.19, 459 A.2d 641, 658 n.19 (1983). In Allen, the
New Jersey Supreme Court, vacating an order prohibiting publication of certain evidence and
testimony outside the presence of a jury, rejected mandatory imposition of guidelines as an
appropriate method for control of prejudicial publicity. 73 N.J. at 141, 373 A.2d at 381.
66. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
68. See J. Stanga, supra note 2, at 8-9; supra notes 35-63 and accompanying text.
69. H. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at xvii.
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in the foreword to his book, Trial by Newspaper.7" But Sullivan
would have been hard pressed to provide convincing evidence for his
remarkable generalization. Even the ABA's Reardon Committee felt
compelled to address the possibility that prejudicial publicity might
be a trivial problem.71
The Reardon Committee admitted that "[a]ny effort to assess
the magnitude of the problem-the number of cases in which serious
questions of possible prejudice are raised by news coverage and public statements-is bound ultimately to rest in some degree on inference."7 2 The Committee conceded that only a small percentage of
criminal cases actually go to trial and that questions of prejudicial
publicity are likely to arise in connection with only a fraction of
those.7 a But it asserted that such statistics understate the problem,
since in one two-year period at least 100 reported appellate decisions
raised the issue of prejudicial publicity, and these decisions undoubtedly represented only the "tip of the iceberg" of trial court experience with the problem. 4 The Committee also pointed to its survey of
defense counsel in twenty metropolitan communities, the results of
which showed that the fifty-four respondents reported 300 cases in
which they "thought reporting by the news media created a significant problem of possible prejudice to the defendant. '7 5 The Committee also cited its content analysis of the leading newspaper in each of
the same twenty cities.76 During a one-month period, the Committee
found "at least 15 and perhaps 20 or more cases in which the nature,
prominence, and timing of the news coverage raised the most serious
77
questions of potential prejudice.
There are reasons to question the validity of the Committee's
data. The fifty-four defense attorneys who responded to the survey
constituted only twenty-seven percent of the 200 who received questionnaires 8-a very poor response rate that makes generalization
risky. Nor is it clear how representative the fifty-four were or
70. Id.
71. REARDON REPORT (TENT. DRAFT), supra note 43, at 22-23.
72. Id. at 22.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 23 (noting that only defendants who have had motions regarding media interference dismissed would appeal, and that the granted motions at the trial court level are not

reported in published decisions).
75. Id. at 23-24.
76. Id. at 24.
77. Id. The Committee did not determine how many of those were disposed of without
trial. Id. at 24 n.ll.
78. Id. at 252.
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whether they may have simply represented the most disgruntled of
the lawyers surveyed. Three respondents alone accounted for 186 of
the 300 troublesome cases mentioned. 9 This might suggest exaggeration, or, at the very least, that the survey ought to have controlled
for how long the attorneys had been practicing and more clearly defined what it meant by prejudicial publicity. s0 Further, defense attorneys would seem to be an inherently biased source on whom to base
a generalization about the impact of prejudicial publicity-a possibility made even more plausible by examination of the committee's
8
data from trial judges. '
Unfortunately, the Committee did not ask judges precisely the
same questions as defense attorneys.82 The judges were asked how
often they had reprimanded the media about reporting that occurred
before or during trial.8 3 Thirty-nine said never, only two said occasionally, and apparently the remainder did not respond directly.84
Twenty-seven judges said they occasionally requested reporters to
withhold information from publication.85 Of those twenty-seven,
twenty-two reported having generally or always received compliance
and only one reported having such requests refused. 86 In other
words, the picture painted by the judges-the judicial actors most
likely to have an objective view of the situation-is far less severe
than that painted by defense attorneys.8 7
The Committee's content analysis of newspapers is also less
than convincing since, as the Committee conceded, it did not determine how many of the cases it considered actually went to trial.,
Perhaps the best argument-and one made by the Committee-is
that the magnitude of the problem is qualitative rather than quantitative. In other words, even if the problem occurs in a relatively
small number of situations, these are precisely the cases that most
79. See id. at 24.
80. See supra note 44 (setting forth six types of information recommended by the Rear-

don Committee not to be made public).
81. The response rate from the survey of trial judges was low: only 68 of 200 judges (34
percent) responded. Id. at 245.

82. See id. at 252-58, app. C (setting forth the questions asked of defense counsel and
the answers).

83. Id. at 246.
84.

Id. at 247.

85. Id.
86.

Id.

87. See id. at 252-58; supra note 75-77 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 77.
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severely test the fairness of the judicial process.8"
A series of more carefully designed studies appears to confirm
that the problem of prejudicial publicity is relatively small. Alfred
Friendly and Ronald Goldfarb examined felony court records in
Washington, D.C. for a year, read coverage of those cases in the
Washington Post, and then followed the cases to determine their ultimate disposition.90 They concluded:
A major newspaper in a major city in a recent year did not even
mention with so much as a line of type 80 percent of those accused
of committing major crimes in its own back yard. Of the one-fifth
who were mentioned, 72 percent were written about in only one
story, and with few exceptions, these appeared long before trial at
the time of arrest or indictment .... Any realistic consideration of
the effect of this coverage on these cases, then, can refer at most to
only 2 per cent of these defendants who received enough press
mention to raise even the possibility of prejudicial fallout. And that
potential exists only on the artificial assumption that the printing of
four or more newspaper stories about a defendant is per se
prejudicial."

Shortly thereafter, Thomas Eimermann and Rita Simon published a content analysis of the coverage received by criminal cases
in two newspapers in a Midwestern city.92 They found a substantial
number of violations of the Reardon Report's recommendations,93
and that more serious felonies received more prejudicial treatment
than lesser crimes.94 However, they downplayed the significance of
89. See REARDON REPORT (TENT. DRAFT), supra note 43, at 25.
90. A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 59.
91. Id. at 62-63 (footnote omitted). Further analysis revealed that jury trials were more
common for the heavier publicized defendants than for others, and that findings of guilt were
virtually the same regardless of amount of publicity. Id. at 66. Friendly and Goldfarb also
surveyed all state attorneys general and the district attorneys in the 50 largest American cities.
Id. Eighty percent of the attorneys general responded. Id. The authors' concluded:
The case where press interference with trial justice is even claimed is extraordinary. Law officials throughout the United States thus testified that the problem,
assumed to be commonplace and overwhelming by most critics of the press, actually
arises very infrequently-and when it is raised, the contention is seldom accepted by
the courts.
Id, at 68. Of course, these respondents may inherently be as unlikely to see a problem as
defense attorneys. See supra text accompanying note 81 (arguing that defense attorneys might
be an inherently biased source on the issue of prejudicial publicity).
92. Eimermann & Simon, Newspaper Coverage of Crimes and Trials: Another Empirical Look at the Free Press-Fair Trial Controversy, 47 JOURNALISM Q. 142 (1970).
93. See supra note 44 (setting forth the Reardon Committee's recommendations).
94. See Eimerman & Simon, supra note 92, at 143.
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these findings because they also found no correlation between guilty
verdicts and prejudicial publicity. 5
John Stanga interviewed judges, prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys in three Wisconsin cities and found that none of
them considered "trial by newspaper" to be a major problem in their
communities. 96 Stanga also conducted a content analysis of newspaper coverage of criminal cases in the same three cities.97 He found
that about twenty percent of the stories contained such prejudicial
information as past criminal records and confessions.98 Nevertheless,
he argued that it would be risky to assume that prejudicial publicity
was a serious problem; many of the items appeared in routine stories
that were not prominently displayed, few criminal cases ever go to
trial, and most potentially prejudicial material involved a small number of criminal defendants. 99 On the other hand, Stanga speculated
that the repetition in subsequent stories of prejudicial information-and even repetition of the defendant's name-could have a
prejudicial impact, as could implicit suggestions of guilt (often inherently resulting from the dominance of law enforcement sources). 10
In a major study of criminal appeals from 1976 to 1980, Professor Dale Spencer found only twenty-one instances where the highest
state court overturned convictions because of prejudicial news coverage.10' He also found only 368 cases out of more than 63,000 criminal conviction appeals in which defense attorneys raised the issue of
prejudicial publicity. 102 Spencer's findings are consistent with results
95. Id. at 143-44.
96.

J. Stanga, supra note 2, at 240-45.

97. Id. at 304-11.
98.

Id. at 304.

99.

Id. at 307-08.

100. Id. at 308-10. Another way in which media coverage might shape the criminal
justice process is by "setting the agenda" of prosecutors. See, e.g., J. EISENSTEIN, POLITICS AND
THE LEGAL PROCESS 104 (1973) (stating that "[i]f a crime ... attracts great publicity, [the

prosecutor] has little choice but to prosecute" in order to protect his reputation); Pritchard,
Homicide and Bargained Justice: The Agenda-Setting Effect of Crime News on Prosecutors,
50 PUB. OPINION Q. 143 (1986) (examining the relationship between newspaper coverage and

whether prosecutors engage in plea bargaining); Pritchard, Dilts & Berkowitz, Prosecutors'
Use of External Agendas in ProsecutingPornography Cases, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 392 (1987)
(studying factors, such as press coverage, that influenced Indiana prosecutors concerning pornography cases); J. Stanga, supra note 2, at 246-54 (reporting the outcome of a study where
judges and defense attorneys were asked whether they believed press publicity influenced a

prosecutor to file a more serious charge than if there had been no publicity). This issue is
beyond the scope of this Article.

101.

Spencer, Coverage Seldom Causefor Conviction Reversal, Presstime, Oct. 1982, at

16, col. 1.

102. Id.
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of a recent analysis by Ralph Frasca.103 He drew on literature about
felony case-processing, studies of press coverage of crime and research on information retention and the effectiveness of trial safeguards in an effort "to estimate how likely jurors are to obtain a bias
from press coverage of a case and to retain that bias throughout the
trial."104 His conclusion: press-induced bias would occur in only one
of every 10,000 cases.105
Taken together, the research suggests that in an absolute, quantitative sense, prejudicial publicity is a small problem. At worst, the
data indicate only a potential for prejudicial impact. The quantitative research done for the Reardon Report seems to be a particularly
shaky basis for generalization. 0 6 Of course, it does not follow that
the problem is an unimportant one. The research also indicates what
anyone who attends to the news media must intuitively feel: that
prejudicial publicity is particularly likely in the most newsworthy
cases. Consequently, it is useful to turn to the question of how seriously judicial actors regard the problem.
B.

How Seriously Judicial Sources View the Issue

The research done for the Reardon Report seemed to assume
that judges, lawyers and police-the same people who are journalists' judicial sources-regard prejudicial publicity as a serious problem. The Reardon survey simply did not ask to what degree respondents perceived any problem .'0° Fortunately, subsequent research
has more directly addressed that question.' 08 Although the evidence
is somewhat contradictory, on the whole it seems to indicate that
judicial sources do not regard prejudicial publicity as a major
problem.
As already noted, Stanga's study of journalists and judicial
sources in three Wisconsin cities is consistent with this generalization.109 However, a study of Washington, D.C. journalists, judges
and lawyers concluded that a central reason for many judges' reluc103.
DICATURE

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
and their
Study).

Frasca, Estimating the Occurrence of Trials Prejudicedby Press Coverage, 72 JU162 (1988).
Id. at 163.
Id. at 169.
See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
REARDON REPORT (TENT. DRAFT), supra note 43, at 228-58, app. C.
See infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text (discussing Stanga's Study).
J. Stanga, supra note 2, at 240-45 (setting forth the substance of the questionnaires
responses); see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing Stanga's
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tance to cooperate with reporters was concern about "the dangers of
'pre-trial publicity'.'"'110 Such concern was apparently not an important factor for lawyers."1 Unfortunately, the Washington, D.C. findings must be interpreted with great caution because of the impressionistic approach used by the bar association committee that
generated them. Subjects were interviewed, but apparently not in
any systematic manner." 2
Drechsel, however, gathered data from judicial sources in three
states that suggests minimal concern about media interference with
fair trials."l 3 As Table 1 illustrates, judges in none of the states expressed much concern about prejudicial publicity, nor did the attorneys surveyed in Minnesota. Why more Minnesota prosecutors than
defense attorneys complained about this issue is unclear; perhaps
they perceive that prejudicial publicity can complicate prosecution if
the defense makes an issue of it." 4
Of course, another plausible interpretation of this data is that
prejudicial publicity is a multidimensional concept. 1 5 That is, few
judges and lawyers may complain directly about media interference
with fair trials, but that is what they have in mind when they complain about bias, sensationalism and even inaccuracy. Without further research, we cannot know whether this is the case and in any
event, it seems surprising that so few sources would explicitly mention a problem that has received so much attention.
110.

COMMUNITY EDUCATION COMM. OF THE YOUNG LAWYERS SECTION OF THE Dis-

TRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR ASS'N, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE WASHINGTON,

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR BRIDGING THE COMMUNICATIONS GAP

111.

See id. at 15-16.

112.

Id. at 3-5.

D.C.

COURTS:

14 (1972).

113. See NEWS MAKING, supra note 2, at 113; Drechsel, Judges' Perceptions of Fair
Trial-Free Press Issue, 62 JOURNALISM Q. 388, 389 (1985).
114. Ironically, Drechsel also found judges and public defenders in Minnesota who complained vigorously that reporters frequently allowed themselves to be used by prosecutors.
NEWS MAKING, supra note 2, at 113. Drechsel also surveyed daily newspaper court reporters
in Minnesota; only one of 24 mentioned feeling torn between the need to develop good stories
and the possibility of interfering with a fair trial. Id. at 114.

115.

Stanga also noted this possibility in light of some of the comments he obtained

from lawyers. For example, he found one lawyer who said his client faced possible jury

prejudice because of a general sentiment in the local press against junk yards given that his
client was a junk dealer, although this was not germane to the issue of the case. J. Stanga,
supra note 2, at 244-45.
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Table I
Percentage of Sources Citing "Biggest" Complaint
About Media Court Reporting

Judges
Type of Complaint

Minn.

N.E.

Penn.

Minn.
Prosecuting

Minn.
Defense

Attys

Attys

Reporters lack knowledge

15%

10%

17%

Inaccurate/incomplete
reporting ..............

about judicial system ...

35

53

53

25

38

Biased reporting ........

16

10

0

4

18

Sensationalism ..........

14

15

0

20

14

Coverage interferes
with fair trial .........

1

6

0

14

6

Miscellaneous* .........

18

6

30

30

18

(n=99)

(n=68)

(n=30)

8%

(n=51)

6%

(n=50)

* Includes respondents who specifically said "no complaint."

Another intriguing piece of evidence is a study by Regina Sherard of criminal defendants' perceptions of prejudicial publicity as a
factor in their convictions.110 Interviews were conducted with 138
male felons at the Central Missouri Correctional Center.1 17 Fiftythree percent said they did not receive a fair trial, but of that fiftythree percent, only three inmates blamed media coverage. 1 8 Moreover, from the data one cannot be certain that the three even considered the publicity to have been literally prejudicial."19 About half the
inmates indicated that their arrests and/or trials had been covered
by local news media; of those, about half said their cases received
116.

Sherard, Fair Press or Trial Prejudice?: Perceptions of Criminal Defendants, 64
Q. 337 (1987).
Id. at 338.
Id. at 339-40.
See id. The two most common reasons given for the perception that they did not

JOURNALISM

117.
118.
119.

receive fair trials were poor defense counsel and the fact that they were given what they perceived to be excessive sentences. Id. at 339. Sixty-nine percent of the interviewees had pleaded
guilty. Id.
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minimal coverage. 12°
C. If There Is a Problem,'Are Guidelines Efficacious?
Almost since discussion of the fair trial-free press issue began-certainly since the Reardon Report and the development of
bench-bar-press guidelines in various states-there has been a presumption that guidelines and standards can be an effective tool in
avoiding publication of prejudicial information. 21 This assumption
rests on at least two premises: first, that sources and reporters will be
familiar with such guidelines, and second, that they will follow them.
Two studies done in Wisconsin raise questions about the validity
of the first assumption. 122 Dianne Hamilton surveyed county bar
presidents in Wisconsin, asking them about their experience with
voluntary guidelines developed jointly by the Wisconsin state bar,
bench and media.123 Twenty-four of fifty-six presidents responded
and twenty-three of them said they didn't think most lawyers in their
jurisdictions were familiar with the guidelines. 2 4 "[M]any respondents replied that 'I've never heard of this,'" Hamilton reported. 25
Yet in the previous year, the Media-Law Relations Committee of
the State Bar of Wisconsin had published a Wisconsin Lawyer's
Guide to the News Media which contained the guidelines. 26
Approximately six months after Hamilton's survey, Don Paley
surveyed district attorneys and newspaper court reporters in thirtyone Wisconsin cities with daily newspapers.127 Three-fourths of the
district attorneys and two-thirds of the reporters responded. 2 Approximately two-thirds of the district attorney respondents reported
no knowledge or familiarity with the state's fair trial-free press
guidelines; 129 of those who had some knowledge of the guidelines,
only half knew that the guidelines provided specific recommenda120.

Id.

121.

See supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text (discussing various guidelines).

122. D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Voluntary Bench-Bar-Media Agreements (May 9,
1985) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Hofstra Law Review); D. Paley, Free Press v.
Fair Trial: Are Voluntary Guidelines a Solution? (1985) (unpublished manuscript on file at
the Hofstra Law Review).
123. D. Hamilton, supra note 122, at 4, app. A.
124. Id.

125. Id. at 4.
126. MEDIA-LAw RELATIONS COMM., STATE BAR OF Wis., A
GUIDE TO THE NEws MEDIA (1984) [hereinafter LAWYER'S GUIDE].
127.
128.

D. Paley, supra note 122, at 6.
Id. at 6.

129.

Id. at 7.
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tions for courtroom behavior. 30 The newspaper reporters were more
knowledgeable: seventy percent had some familiarity with the guidelines,'131 and eighty-five percent of:those respondents said journalists
32
often referred to the guidelines while judges and attorneys did not.
On the other hand, a recent survey of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and reporters in the state of Washington has reached
a different conclusion. Professor Val Limburg and three colleagues
found the majority of superior court judges and prosecutors to be
familiar with that state's bench-bar-press guidelines, although defense attorneys reported markedly less familiarity. 3 Levels of high
familiarity were found more often among reporters than among the
judges and lawyers. 34 However, unlike Paley-whose survey asked
the respondents a series of true-false questions about the guidelines-the Limburg survey simply allowed respondents to rate their
familiarity with the guidelines
on a scale ranging from "not famil35
familiar."'
"most
iar" to
Several studies have attempted to measure the efficacy of guidelines in terms of the second premise underlying them: whether people
actually follow them. In 1970, after conducting a national survey of
attorneys, bar association leaders and editors, Professor J. Edward
Gerald concluded that the Reardon guidelines had resulted in a lessening of prejudicial publicity by altering the behavior of both news
sources and journalists. 1 6 Several years later, however, a content
analysis of pre-trial crime news reporting by Tankard, Middleton
and Rimmer,13 7 found violations of the guidelines in two-thirds of
the news stories in a national sample.' 3 8 Even more sobering, their
130. Id.
131. See id. at 8.
132. Id.
133. See Limburg, Lovrich, Sheldon & Wasmann, How Print and Broadcast JournalIsts Perceive Performance of Reporters in Courtroom, 65 Journalism Q. 621, 623 (1988).
Sixty-two percent of the defense attorneys reported being only somewhat familiar or not familiar at all with the guidelines, compared with 12 percent of the judges and 37 percent of the
prosecutors. See id. at 623, Table 1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Gerald, Press-BarRelationships ProgressSince Sheppard and Reardon, 47 JOURNALISM Q. 223, 232 (1970). A survey by the ABA in 1974 reached similar conclusions. See
Tankard, Middleton & Rimmer, Compliance with American Bar Association Fair Trial-Free
Press Guidelines, 56 JOURNALISM Q. 464, 464 (1979) (citing LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, FAIR TRIAL FREE PRESS: VOLUNTARY

(1974)).
137. Tankard, Middleton & Rimmer, supra note 136, at 464.
138. See id. at 466. Of 167 stories examined, 113 contained a minimum of one violation.

AGREEMENTS
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research disclosed that violations were slightly more common in
states with voluntary guidelines than in states without them. 3 '
The Tankard, Middleton and Rimmer findings 140 are consistent
with the findings of a more recent study at Washington State University, which showed that most judges, lawyers and even journalists
admitted relatively low rates of compliance with that state's guidelines. 14 ' Eighty-five percent of the print reporters rated their own behavior as consistent with the guidelines,' 4 2 but only forty-two percent
of the other respondents considered the print reporters to be in compliance with the guidelines.143 Only half of the broadcast reporters
and fewer than half of the defense attorneys rated themselves as
generally compliant with the guidelines.1' Nevertheless, the Washington study found that as prosecutors and print journalists gained
more experience using the guidelines, they tended to view them more
positively; 45 but defense attorneys, who tended to have less exposure
to the guidelines, 4 6 liked the guidelines less as they gained more experience with them. 4 The Washington study also found that experience with the guidelines appeared to make the various occupations
more tolerant of each other's major concerns. 4 For example, more
experienced print journalists gave more weight to the values of fair
trial and privacy and less to free press than print journalists with less
experience with the guidelines.' 4 9
Other than to say that the state guidelines are apparently not as
effective as their proponents might wish them to be, it is difficult to
Id.
139. Id. at 467.
140. Id. at 468 (setting forth a summary and the conclusion).
141. Sheldon, Lovrich, Limburg & Wasmann, The Effect of Voluntary Bench-Bar-Press
Guidelines on ProfessionalAttitudes Towards Free Press, Privacy and Fair Trial Values, 72
JUDICATURE 114, 116 (1988).

142. Id. at 116, Table 1.
143. Id. Sixty-nine percent of the judges and 67 percent of the prosecutors rated their
own behavior as generally consistent with the bench/bar principles. Sixty percent of the other
respondents gave such a rating to judges and 53 percent of the other respondents gave such a
rating to prosecutors. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 118.
146. Id. (referring to both public defenders and private defense attorneys).
147. Id. The authors concluded that the defense attorneys' reactions were a result of
their perception that the media are unwilling or unable to abide by the guidelines. Id. at 119.
Moreover, broadcast reporters were less favorably disposed toward the guidelines than print
reporters. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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generalize with confidence about this body of research. Consequently, it becomes more important to have a larger understanding
of the working relationship between reporters and their judicial
sources from which news of the criminal process emerges.
IV. NEws

MAKING IN THE JUDICIARY

A.

Background

Despite all the attention the fair trial-free press issue received
throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, very little systematic research was done on relationships between journalists and sources in
the judiciary. What scholarship there was focused on appellate
courts, and primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court."' 0 Yet, it is the
journalist-source interaction in trial courts that would seem to be
151
most relevant to the fair trial-free press issue.
The first major theoretical, social scientific work on journalistsource interaction in the trial courts was Stanga's study of these relationships in three Wisconsin cities. 1 52 As Stanga astutely noted:
The real dynamics of the fair trial-free press issue, after all, are
played out in the daily interactions between newsmen and their
news sources. Accordingly, the way the newsman perceives and
performs his job is important in determining the effectiveness of
legal rules and norms in the "trial by newspaper" area."5 3
Stanga then took the role theory154 and exchange theory' 55 used in
150.

The leading work in this area is D. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS

MEDIA (1968).
151.

See supra notes 69-106 and accompanying text (exploring and evaluating studies

conducted to demonstrate the prevalence of prejudicial publicity).
152.
153.
154.

J. Stanga, supra note 2; see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
J. Stanga, supra note 2, at 342.
Role theory examines an individual's behavior "in terms of how it is shaped by the

demands and rules of others, by their sanctions for his conforming and nonconforming behavior, and by the individual's own understanding and conceptions of what his behavior should
be." Drechsel, Mass Communication of the Law: Toward Theoretical Understandingof Jour-

nalists' Interaction with Judicial Sources, COmm. & L., Aug. 1986, at 25 (citing ROLE THEORY: CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH 4 (B. Biddle & E. Thomas eds. 1966)). In the context of the

fair trial-free press debate, role theory examines how reporters and sources view their own and
each other's respective functions, and how these views affect their relationships. See NEws

MAKING, supra note 2, at 15-17.
155.

Exchange theory postulates that human interaction is characterized by the ex-

change of something of value or utility in a social-psychological sense and in which there are
rewards and costs. Drechsel, supra note 154, at 24. "[It] suggests that people will or will not
interact depending on I) the presence of tangible or intangible commodities to be exchanged;
2) power, which depends in part on the commodities the respective parties have; and 3) incentive." Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 159-63.
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other "news making" research 56 and applied it to interaction between journalists and police, judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys. Using role theory, he recognized that some reporters fit the
role of what he called "informers"-journalists who saw the press as
an intermediary between policy-makers and the electorate and saw
their jobs as giving the public facts on which democratic evaluations
of government performance could be based. 157 He saw others fitting
the role of "guardians"-journalists who perceived their jobs as
overseeing government and guarding against government incompe158
tence and misdeeds.
Stanga next analyzed interactions between the journalists and
their sources in terms of an exchange model. 59 This approach seeks
to explain the news making process as one in which the participants
interact to the degree that each has something the other wants.', 0
He concluded that the reporters and sources exchanged such "commodities" as friendship, information and ego-massage, and he found
the "informer" role orientation itself to be a commodity of exchange. 6 ' Although the tendency was for the reporter to operate
most frequently as an "informer,"'6 2 a reporter might assume informer orientations toward some sources and guardian orientations
toward others. 6 3
One might logically guess that prejudicial publicity problems
are most likely to be generated by "guardians," but Stanga's work
suggests just the opposite:
The police reporter must rely on police to obtain most of his news.
The informer is in a much better position to obtain that information than the guardian, for the informer does not approach news
sources with a sense of mistrust, and even may identify with his
sources. Since the reporter must rely on his news sources in order
to obtain the kind of information he wants and when he wants it,
there is a tendency for crime news to reflect a favorable bias toward news sources, particularly the police....
156. Stanga borrowed particularly from the work of Delmer Dunn and Bernard Cohen.
See generally B. COHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1963); D. DUNN, PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRESS (1969). Stanga was also influenced by the work of Dan Nimmo. See
generally D. NImmo, NEWSGATHERING IN WASHINGTON (1964).
157. J. Stanga, supra note 2, at 165.

158. Id. at 165-66.
159.

See id. at 238-45.

160. See id.
161. See id. at 344.
162. See id. at 343.
163. See id. at 173.
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Since the police news source gives the informer-oriented reporter much potentially prejudicial information, the informer could
report much more information adverse to criminal defendants than
he does. But the debate over the fair trial-free press issue has made
the police officer sensitive to the possible deleterious consequences,
including reprimands to himself, of releasing such information for
publication. Consequently, the informer obtains much more information than the guardian, but the price he must pay for it is the
agreement not to publish everything he knows. Nonetheless, more
news items potentially prejudicial to an accused should be reported
by informers than guardians, simply because the informer has access to more information than the guardian."'

The only other published work focusing specifically on routine
interaction between journalists and sources in the trial courts has
been a series of studies which this author has conducted. 106 The first
of these studies was a preliminary descriptive survey of all non-metropolitan daily newspaper reporters in Minnesota."6 6 The study concluded that reporters relied most heavily on prosecutors, law enforcement sources, court clerks and judges as sources, and depended far
less on defense attorneys; 6 7 the reporters rated most sources as quite
cooperative. 168 In addition, the results demonstrated that reporters
pay more attention to criminal actions than to other court activity. 169
Subsequently, this study was expanded to include surveys of
trial judges, court clerks, prosecutors, public defenders and private
practice attorneys in Minnesota, 70 and surveys of trial judges in
Wisconsin,' 7 ' Pennsylvania 172 and a northeastern state.'73 The goal
164. Id. at 343-44 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
165. See infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
166. Drechsel, How Minnesota Newspapers Cover the Trial Courts, 62 JUDICATURE
195 (1978).
167. Id. at 199. The defense attorneys generally provided background information. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 198-99. Fewer than half the reporters covered miscellaneous civil cases. See
Id. at 198. For a content analysis strongly confirming this point, see Drechsel, Netteburg &
Aborisade, Community Size and Newspaper Reporting of Local Courts, 57 JOURNALISM Q.
71, 74-75 (1980).
170, NEws MAKING, supra note 2, at 96-98.
171. Portions of the data from this study have been published in Drechsel, Accountability, Representation and the Communication Behavior of Trial Judges, 40 W. POL. Q. 685
(1987) [hereinafter Accountability], and Drechsel, Uncertain Dancers: Judges and the News
Media, 70 JUDICATURE 264 (1987) [hereinafter Uncertain Dancers].
172. Drechsel, Statistics: Pennsylvania Judges Survey 1986 (unpublished survey on file
at Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter Judges Survey].
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of this research was to develop a better and more theoretical understanding of how journalists and these sources interacted to generate
judicial news. Certain portions of prior surveys were replicated while
others were refined and expanded. 17 4 The results reported here are
those most directly bearing on the concerns raised by the fair trial1 75
free press debate.
B.

Survey Methods and Findings

1. The Survey Method.- In the study conducted by this author, data was collected through questionnaires administered by mail
and in person from 1980 to 1986. In Minnesota, questionnaires were
sent to all 207 state trial judges, to all eighty-seven county attorneys
(state prosecutors) plus a dozen assistant county attorneys in the
most heavily populated counties, to eighty-seven public defenders,
and to all thirty-one daily newspaper reporters who covered
courts.' 76 Two-thirds of the judges and prosecutors, seventy-one percent of the public defenders and seventy-seven percent of the reporters responded. 7 In the northeastern state, superior court judges
were surveyed during a judges' workshop in 1983 and responses were
obtained from seventy-eight percent of the state's 125 judges.1 78 In
Wisconsin, all 199 circuit court judges were surveyed in late 1985
and three-fourths responded.179 In Pennsylvania, surveys were administered to court of common pleas judges as part of a workshop in
1986 for president judges. Questionnaires were sent to all fifty-nine
president judges expected to attend the workshop, and fifty-four percent responded. 80
173. Portions of the data from this study have been published elsewhere. See Drechsel,
JudicialSelection and Trial Judge-JournalistInteraction in Two States, 10 JusT. SYs. J. 6

(1985) [hereinafter Judicial Selection]. Due to an agreement between the author and state
court administrators there, the name of the northeastern state is omitted. Id. at 10.

174. See JudicialSelection, supra note 173, at 9-10.
175. See infra notes 181-225 and accompanying text.
176. See NEws MAKING, supra note 2, at 97-98. The responses from court clerks and
private practice attorneys are less central to the fair trial-free press issue under consideration
here and are excluded from the current analysis. This survey was conducted in late 1979 and
early 1980. Id. at 96.

177. See id. at 97.
178.
179.

See Judicial Selection, supra note 173, at 10.
See Accountability, supra note 171, at 689; UncertainDancers, supra note 171, at

267.
180. See Judges Survey, supra note 172. President judges have administrative responsibilities for their judicial districts. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 325(e) (Purdon 1981). However,
in many districts they also have full trial responsibilities; only two of the 32 respondents reported spending half or more of their time on administrative duties. See Judges Survey, supra
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2. Amount and Types of Interaction Between Journalist and Judicial Sources.- As Table 2 indicates, journalists do have contact
with judicial sources, particularly with prosecutors.181 Although the
measurements used in Minnesota and the northeastern state were
rather crude, surveys in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania produced more
specific results.'8 2 Wisconsin circuit court judges reported an average
of about four contacts with reporters per month;183 the Pennsylvania
president judges reported an average of about five and one-half contacts per month.18 4 The frequency of contact reported by Minnesota
prosecutors suggests that prosecutors are in a position to influence
journalists' agendas. The frequency of contact with Minnesota prosecutors versus defense attorneys suggests a prosecutorial bias that

might lead to claims of prejudicial news coverage."

5

Table 2
Percentage of Sources Indicating Frequency of Contact
with Reporters During Past Six Months

Source Type
Never

Frequency of Contact
At
Least
Weekly
Once

Daily
1%

Number
of
Respondents
129

Minnesota Judges

10%

76%

13%

Northeast Judges

21

69

9

0

75

2

58

41

0

64

19

81

0

0

48

Minnesota Prosecutors
Minnesota Public
Defenders

note 172, at 21.
181. Minnesota reporters were also asked about their frequency of contact with various
other sources. The results in general resembled those reported by the sources themselves. Although the Minnesota research did not focus on law enforcement sources, fifty percent of the
reporters reported weekly or daily contact with such sources. NEWS MAKING, supra note 2, at
101.
182. See generally Uncertain Dancers, supra note 171, at 268 (finding that ninety-seven
percent of the circuit judges and all of the appeals judges surveyed in Wisconsin reported
having been personally contacted by a reporter since assuming their judgeships); Judges Survey, supra note 172, at 2 (finding one hundred percent of the Pennsylvania judges surveyed
reported having been personally contacted by a reporter while a judge).
183. See Uncertain Dancers, supra note 171, at 268.
184. See Judges Survey, supra note 172, at 4.
185. See supra note 100.
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It is also clear that judicial sources pay reasonably close attention to media coverage of cases with which they are involved. Table
3 indicates that newspaper coverage appears to receive more atten-

tion than television coverage.""s This is an interesting finding in light
of research suggesting that broadcast reporters are perceived to be
more frequent violators of fair trial-free press guidelines than print
reporters. 87 Of course, it may be that the judicial and legal sources
responding generally read newspapers, but pay attention to television

only in cases where they are concerned about the coverage.
Table 3
Percentage of Sources
Who Generally Attend to Media Coverage
of Cases They Handle

Generally Attend toa. . .
Type of Source

Number
Responding

Newspapers

Television

Minnesota Judges

91%

--

b

127

N.E. Judges

70

--

b

95

Pennsylvania Judges

72

46

32/28-

Wisconsin Judges

71

52.

143/139

Minn. Prosecutors

94

--

b

66

Minn. Public Defenders

98

--

b

62

aThe question was asked as either whether sources "generally read" accounts of cases they
handle, or whether they "usually or always" do so.
bSource was not asked to distinguish newspaper from television.
CFirst number indicates respondents answering regarding newspapers; second number
indicates respondents answering regarding television.

Further insight into the possible origins of prejudicial publicity
can be gained by examining data on the types of information judicial
sources give reporters. Tables 4 and 5 provide such data, with partic186. See Uncertain Dancers, supra note 171, at 270.
187. Sheldon, Lovrich, Limburg & Wasmann, supra note 141, at 116. The research also
suggested that broadcast reporters viewed themselves as behaving less consistently with the
fair trial-free press guidelines than the print reporters. See id.
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ular focus on types of information that might be problematic. The
last three types of information-opinions, suggestions and guidance-are the most likely to cause prejudicial news coverage. At the
very least, any sources offering opinion and speculation appear to
flirt with violation of fair trial-free press guidelines. Despite this conclusion, Table 4 shows that one-fourth of the prosecutors and defense
attorneys are willing to provide such information. 8 8 All of the
sources, except for the northeastern judges, are quite willing to suggest stories and offer guidance on whether cases are worth coverage.
The reporters' response generally parallels that of the sources.
Table 4
Percentage of Sources Who Have Provided
or Would Provide Types of Assistance to Journalists

Type of Assistance

Minn.
Judgesa

N.E.
Judgesa

Wis.
Judgesa

Penn.
Judgesa

Public
Prosecutorsa Defendersa

Factual information
about a case ...........

76%

30%

56%

53%

92%

71%

Explanation of legal
language and process

95

59

88

91

95

89

Source's opinion or
speculation about case

9

2

29

24

Suggestions steering
reporters to stories

46

14

47

56

62

41

Help deciding whether
case is worth coverage

42

11

34

41

48

39

-- b

-- b

aNumber of respondents to each item ranged from 126 to 131 for Minnesota judges; 94
for the northeastern judges; 146 for the Wisconsin judges; 32 for the Pennsylvania judges;
61 to 63 for the prosecutors; and 61 to 62 for the public defenders.
bQuestion not included on Wisconsin and Pennsylvania surveys.

188. This finding is confirmed by the data from Minnesota reporters in Table 5. The
reporters' response suggests that judges, too, are willing to offer opinions and speculation about
cases. However, the reporters' response must be treated with some caution, because the cooperative response reported may come from a fairly small number of sources. Consequently, the
response of the sources may be the more meaningful indicator. The sources' responses are also
likely to be conservative, especially if one assumes that sources may be reluctant to admit the
full degree of their cooperation.
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Table 5

Percentage of Minnesota Reporters
Who Have Obtained Types of Assistance from Sources*

% of Reporters Obtaining Information
From....
Judges

Type of Assistance

Factual information
about a case ..........

79%

Prosecutors

100%

Defenders

Number
Responding

83%

24

Explanation of legal
language and process ...

83

88

58

24

35

44

39

23

Suggestions steering
reporters to stories .....

63

54

33

24

Helping deciding whether
case is worth coverage ..

48

44

22

23

Source's opinion or
speculation about case

*

..

The reporters were asked the following question: "Again, think back over the past six

months or so. This time

. . .

please indicate

. . .

those sources which, in response to your

request, have supplied each type of information or assistance."

Another indicator of the nature of reporter-source interaction is

the amount of unsolicited information that flows from sources to reporters. Tables 6 and 7 provide a picture of the degree to which this
occurs in the judiciary. With the exception of the northeastern
judges, a considerable number of judicial sources admit having offered information to reporters.
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Table 6
Percentage of Sources
Who Have Volunteered Information to Reporters

Number
Responding

Percentage

Type of Source

134
95
133
28
66
63

17%
2
32
64
39
16

Minnesota Judges
Northeastern Judges
Wisconsin Judges
Pennsylvania Judges
Minn. Prosecutors
Minn. Public Defenders
Table 7

Percentage of Minnesota Reporters Indicating
How Frequently Sources Have Offered Unsolicited Information

Reporters Who Said...
Occasionally

Frequently

Number
Responding

Never

Rarely

Minnesota Judges

27%

32%

36%

Minn. Prosecutors

21

38

25

17

24

Minn. Public Defenders

29

52

19

0

21

Type of Source

5%

22

The reporters' responses, shown in Table 7, suggest that such
communication may be even more common than the sources admit,
and the data, of course, says nothing about the type of information
that is communicated in this manner. Nor can we tell whether this
information is provided on or off the record, or whether it is ultimately published at all. Nonetheless, the reporters' response indicates that prosecutors are particularly frequent suppliers of unsolicited information and that defense attorneys are the least frequent
suppliers.189 Again, if there is an inherent bias in such information,
189. The large number of Pennsylvania judges who reported having volunteered information may be a result of their positions as president judges. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. In that capacity, they may frequently be offering information pertaining to the
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it would seem likely to favor the prosecution.'
3. Why Sources and Journalists Interact.- An attempt was
made in the Minnesota survey to determine the degree to which the
sources' cooperation with journalists might be attributed to the lawyers' desire to affect the outcome of the cases they handle.'"9 As part
of a list of possible reasons for cooperating, lawyers were asked
whether they ever cooperated with journalists because they believed
"publicity about a case might contribute to a just, correct result."'' l9
Seventeen percent of the prosecutors and forty percent of the public
defenders said they had cooperated for that reason.' 93 The reporters
were asked a similar but not identical question: whether they believed various sources had ever cooperated with them because "they
think the publicity may influence the outcome of a case to their liking.' 94 Of the twenty-two reporters responding, only one thought
judges ever did so, while four thought prosecutors did so and eight
thought defense attorneys did.' 95
This, of course, was an indirect approach to the question of
what role sources might be playing in generating potentially prejudicial publicity. A more direct approach was taken in the Wisconsin
study, although lawyers and reporters were not surveyed. 9 " Since
1969, Wisconsin has had voluntary fair trial-free press guidelines
similar to those recommended by the Reardon Report. 97 Consequently, judges in Wisconsin were asked to rate on a scale of one to
ten how likely they would be to cooperate more with journalists but
for the guidelines.' 9" They were also asked how likely they would be
to cooperate more but for the fact that a reporter's questions involved a criminal rather than a civil case. 9 9 The higher the score
assigned by the judge, the more the judge feels limited by the guideadministration and budget of the court system.

190.

See J. Stanga, supra note 2, at 238-41 (examining the basic quid pro quo relation-

ship between the newsman and the prosecutor); supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text

(discussing prosecutorial influence on journalists).
191. See NEWs MAKING, supra note 2, at 118-24.
192. Id. at 119, 123 (discussing the question asked).
193.

Id.at 119.

194. Id.at 120.
195. See id.
196. See Uncertain Dancers, supra note 171, at 267 (stating that the survey questionnaires were sent to "circuit court and intermediate court of appeals judges ....
).
197. LAWYER's GUIDE, supra note 126; see also supra notes 44-66, 72-89 and accompa-

nying text (discussing and criticizing the Reardon Report).
198.

See Uncertain Dancers, supra note 171, at 269 Table 7.

199. Id.
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lines or by the fact that the case is criminal.2 00 Circuit judges gave
the guidelines an average score of 4.7; they gave the criminal nature
of the case an average of 4.6; they felt most limited by their general
doubts about reporters' competence, giving that factor an average of
5.5201

Such findings, though interesting, still do not help us understand
the real dynamics of reporter-source interaction in the judiciary.
However, the results in three of the four states suggested that many
judicial sources are strikingly willing to cooperate with journalists-perhaps even more willing than journalists are to seek them
out.20 2 Consistent with this conclusion, the Minnesota survey found
that reporters rated the vast majority of all judicial sources as "cooperative" or "very cooperative." 20 3 These findings suggest that "the
press may find more of a reservoir of goodwill and understanding
amongst bench and bar than it might expect,"20 4 and that a conflict
model is not appropriate for characterizing routine judiciary-media
relations.20 5
How, then, might we best understand the interaction between
reporters and sources that generates judicial news? As discussed earlier, Stanga placed his study of the press and criminal justice in the
context of role and exchange theories. 06 Similarly, the Minnesota
study concluded that journalists and judicial sources could be described as fitting role types and engaging in exchange behavior. 0 7
The Minnesota study focused particularly on what might be called
200. Id. at 269 (indicating that judges "were directed to answer on a 10-point scale with
one indicating not at all and 10 indicating a great deal.").
201. Id.
202. See generally NEWS MAKING, supra note 2, at 102-09; Accountability, supra note

171, at 695; Uncertain Dancers, supra note 171, at 266.
203. NEws MAKING, supra note 2, at 109.
204. Id. at 139; see also J. Lipschultz, A Coorientational Analysis of Trial Lawyers and
News Reporter Relationships (Aug. 11, 1989) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the

Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Washington, D.C.) (on
file at Hofstra Law Review) (concluding that trial lawyers and news reporters share many

orientations toward news coverage of courts and see the value of cooperation).
205.

The conflict model describes the relationship between reporters and sources as

"competitive ... marked by a formal and untrusting atmosphere with infrequent and highly

formal communication. Reporter and source disagree in their views of each other's responsibilities and on news judgment . . . ." NEws MAKING, supra note 2, at 17 (citing D. NIMMO,

supra note 156, at 211-17).
206. See supra notes 154-63 and accompanying text (explaining role and exchange

theories).
207. See NEws

MAKING,

supra note 2, at 139.
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the "communication role orientations" of judicial sources. 0 s It found
that most judicial sources could be characterized as "informers,"
those who see their role in the communication process as providing
information factually and without interpretation, or as "educators,"
those who see their role as providing interpretation expanding on the
facts to create better understanding. 0 9 Very few sources could be
categorized as so called "promoters," those who see the communication process as a tool for influencing policy.21 0 The only sources who
showed signs of fitting that category were attorneys-particularly
prosecutors. 211 This finding is consistent with concerns that prosecutors may be responsible for some prejudicial publicity problems, if
the release of information reflecting badly on a defendant is seen as
an attempt to influence the outcome of a case.212 Role theory
predicts that when "informer" and "educator" sources interact with
reporters who see their communication roles as essentially similar to
those of sources, relations between the two will be compatible-generally good and non-conflictive.21 3 The Minnesota study validates this prediction. 1 4
There were indications in the Minnesota data, however, that
suggested other important variables. In general, the elected
sources-judges and prosecutors-seemed more cooperative than
those who were not elected.2 15 Such a finding suggests that sources'
public accountability might be a factor in explaining the emergence
of news from the judiciary. 1 6 The study in the northeastern state
presented an opportunity to explore this possibility further; trial
judges in that state are appointed and never face voters. 21" Logic
suggests that the media provide judges with a communication link to
the public, and that judges who must face voters should be more
likely to see a need to communicate with the public than judges who
208.

Id. at 17-24 (discussing the roles of reporters and judicial sources).

209. Id. at 129.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Drechsel, supra note 154, at 27-28.

214. See Naws

MAKING,

supra note 2, at 129 (concluding that "judicial source-reporter

relations should be generally compatible-relatively free of conflict.").

215. Id. at 109, Table 5.8 (setting forth reporters' view of judges' and prosecutors' willingness to cooperate).

216. Cf. JudicialSelection, supra note 173, at 14-16 (discussing the differing accountability of elected and non-elected judges in Minnesota and a northeastern state).
217. Id. at 10.
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never need face voters.21 Consequently, it was hypothesized that
trial judges in the northeastern state would be significantly less cooperative than those in Minnesota. 19 When the Minnesota survey was
replicated in the northeastern state the results were precisely as hypothesized. 22 0 As Tables 4 and 6 indicate, the non-elected judges
were far less willing to provide assistance when asked and to volunteer information.
Striking though the findings were, the comparative study could
not control for possible political, social, economic and other differences between the states. As a consequence, when the Wisconsin survey was undertaken, accountability variables were built into it. Since
all judges in Wisconsin are elected, accountability was operationalized with a series of questions asking judges to indicate how answerable or responsive they felt to constituents.22' The Wisconsin survey
results showed that accountability was not useful in explaining differences in the degree to which judges cooperated with journalists. 222
It may be that accountability can be studied meaningfully only via
multi-state comparison. Nevertheless, the results also showed that a
number of other variables were useful in explaining judges' cooperation with journalists. 223 The most important was clearly the experiential variable constructed by combining judges' age, years in legal
practice and years on the bench. This variable alone explained fifteen percent of the variation in cooperation. 24 Also important were
judicial ethics and simple lack of time-each explaining six percent
218.

Id. at 12.

219. See id. at 10 & n.3 (providing a full report of the aspect of the study testing this
hypothesis).
220. See id. at 10-12.
221.

Accountability, supra note 171, at 689-90; see also Drechsel, supra note 154, at

23, 28-30 (addressing the theory underlying accountability). In the Wisconsin study, accountability was one of several variables entered into a multiple regression equation. Regression is a
statistical method that allows the researcher to see the unique contribution of each of several
conceptually relevant, independent variables to variance in a dependent variable. In other

words, through regression analysis, it is possible to see what percentage of the variation in
judges' cooperation with reporters-the dependent variable-can be attributed to accountability and a variety of other relevant independent variables. The variables added to the multiple
regression equation included the presence of local media, judges' age, years of legal and judicial experience, judges' political experience, degree of constraint by ethics and time, experience
with adverse publicity, and "delegate" role orientation. See Accountability, supra note 171, at

693.
222. See id. at 695. Accountability was helpful in explaining judges' reliance on the
news media for various purposes. Id. at 695-97.
223. See id. at 698-99.
224. See id. at 691. 694.
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of the variation. 2
Perhaps more interesting for purposes of this Article was the
finding that neither fair trial-free press guidelines nor distinction between civil and criminal cases significantly affected cooperation at
all. Of course, fair trial-free press considerations may have been subsumed within the judicial ethics variable. Or it may simply be that
the fair trial variable is not relevant to judges' cooperation but would
be for other judicial sources. Nonetheless, the data gathered in Minnesota suggest that concerns about prejudicial publicity are unlikely
to be an important factor inhibiting lawyers' cooperation either.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

The social scientific research discussed in this Article suggests
that relationships between media and judiciary cannot best be characterized by a conflict model. 226 This should not be particularly surprising given efforts at cooperation by bench, bar and media during
the past two decades. Relationships between reporters and judicial
sources are simply more compatible than competitive.
The evidence also indicates that the magnitude of the fair trialfree press issue may be overblown. Most trial judges and other judicial sources do not seem to perceive frequent, major problems with
prejudicial publicity. 227 The Wisconsin study suggests that, at least
for judges, concerns about prejudicial publicity are not a significant
factor in determining sources' interaction with reporters.228 One
could conceivably offer a negative interpretation of this finding: that
judicial sources' interaction with reporters is not affected by this variable because, acting in their own or clients' self-interest, sources
will not be deterred in the least by concerns about prejudicial publicity. Such an interpretation has little plausibility with respect to
judges. It has more relevance with respect to lawyers. Perhaps this is
one reason why, at least beginning with the Reardon Report, restrictions on would-be sources have been emphasized. Indeed, the Minnesota data showing the heavy reliance of journalists on law enforcement sources and prosecutors confirms the appropriateness of
focusing attention on those sources when attempting to control pretrial publicity. 29
225.
226.
227.
228.

See
See
See
See

id.at 694.
supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.

229. See supra note 181-85 and accompanying text.
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As for fair trial-free press guidelines, the research suggests that
there is little magic in them. Their chief value may be as a catalyst
for judiciary-media discussion. It is at best questionable whether voluntary guidelines are widely known or followed. 30 Other variables,
such as the role orientations of reporters and sources, 3 1 variation in
the degree to which judicial sources are directly accountable to the
public, 232 the age and experience of sources,2 33 play a far more important role in determining the interaction between reporters and
sources that generates judicial news.
After studying interaction between reporters and government
agency press officers, Dan Nimmo concluded that issues involving
government secrecy and news management "are as much a reflection
of these relationships as they are causes of them. 23 4 Something very
similar might be said of prejudicial publicity and the relationship
between reporters and judicial sources. Prejudicial publicity may be
not so much an indicator of poor relations between press and judiciary as it is a result of routine relationships between reporters and
their judicial sources. The real key to understanding and solving any
serious fair trial-free press problem lies less in developing rules and
guidelines than in knowing about what animates interaction between
journalists and their sources.

230. See supra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
231.

See supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.

232. See supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
234.

D. NINMO, supra note 156, at 208.
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